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I. INTRODUCTION 
Global development diminishes the voices of indigenous 
populations around the world. Resource extraction and commercial use 
threaten even the most isolated groups.1 In an effort to develop enforceable 
rights for indigenous peoples, the United Nations Declaration of the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples sought to protect indigenous peoples through the 
principle of the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (“FPIC”). This paper 
focuses on why the FPIC is struggling to take hold in the international 
community.  
 
* Juris Doctor and Master’s in Public Administration Candidate 2021, 
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana.  
1. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 
(1996). 
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To effectively execute the FPIC, this principle should become 
hard law because countries view hard law as binding. Because most 
nations in the international community view the FPIC as soft law,2 this 
principle has failed to adequately protect indigenous peoples’ rights.  
The international community and the United Nations (“UN”) have 
long recognized general human rights as an obligation of each nation state. 
Finally, in 2007, the UN articulated additional rights specifically for 
indigenous peoples through the FPIC.3 The UN developed the FPIC by 
using key terms and theories from the 1989 International Labour 
Convention No. 169 (“ILO 169”), known as the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention.4 The ILO 169’s members sought to protect two main 
groups of people: 
 
(1) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, 
cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from 
other sections of the national community, and whose 
status is regulated wholly or partially by their own 
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; 
and (2) peoples in independent countries who are 
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from 
the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of 
present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their 
legal status, retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions.5  
 
While each of the 20 countries that ratified the ILO define “indigenous” 
differently,6 the ILO 169 sought to unite the countries’ governments to 
implement a common goal: “To ensure indigenous people’s fundamental 
rights and work together with indigenous communities to end 
discrimination both as it relates to inequalities in outcomes – differences 
 
2. TSEMING YANG ET AL., COMPARATIVE AND GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY ch. 2, 60 (2019) (explaining soft law is a norm 
that is not “quite law,” while hard law is generally accepted as law).  
3. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
G.A. Res. 61/295, at 1, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].  
4. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, 5 (2009). 
5. Id. at 9.  
6. Id. at 10–23. 
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in health, education, employment, etc. – and as it relates to inequalities in 
the processes of governance – participation and involvement of 
indigenous peoples in decision-making, government institutions and 
programs.”7 In 2007, the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) acknowledged the importance of ILO 
169, and articulated the need for appropriate implementation 
mechanisms.8 UNDRIP’s members drafted a series of articles, which now 
form the FPIC.9 
UNDRIP, unlike the ILO 169, is not a legally binding document 
but rather a stated commitment to certain values that may become law.10 
The FPIC’s articulation contained within UNDRIP “is still in a phase of 
dynamic development and the scope of the standard is not yet fully 
clarified.”11 Indigenous populations have experienced more than just 
shortfalls in the effectiveness of this principle. Across the globe, countries 
that have signed onto this principle have continued to commit atrocities 
against indigenous populations, especially when it comes to natural 
resource development.  
For example, 2009 marked a violent time for Peru’s indigenous 
peoples.12 In response to their political activism, the Peruvian government 
classified indigenous peoples in the country as “extremists.”13 The biggest 
driver of the FPIC’s ineffectiveness is national governments teaming up 
with global corporations, as seen in Peru, because of the belief that 
corporations are not bound to the FPIC, and therefore, countries do not 
enforce FPIC requirements.14 If the international community viewed the 
 
7. Id. at 29. (emphasis in the original).  
8. Id. at 30.  
9. UNDRIP, supra note 3, at arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 39. (referencing art. 10 
which states Indigenous peoples shall not be forced from their homes; (2) art. 11 § 2 
which states nations will provide restitution if property is taken without FPIC; (3) art. 
19 which states nations will consult and cooperate in good faith with Indigenous 
peoples; (4) art. 28 which states indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means 
that can include restitution or equitable compensation for land or resources the 
government took without FPIC; and (5) art. 29 § 2 which states nations cannot store 
hazardous chemicals on Indigenous lands without FPIC).  
10. Ipshita Chaturvedi, A Critical Study of Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent in the Context of the Right to Development — Can “Consent” be Withheld?, 
5 J. INDIAN L. & SOC’Y 37, 40 (2014). 
11. S.J. OMBOUTS, HAVING A SAY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT, 20 (2014).  
12. Elizabeth Salmón G., The Struggle for Laws of Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consultation in Peru: Lessons and Ambiguities in the Recognition of 
Indigenous Peoples, 22 P. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 353 (2013). 
13. Id. at 355.  
14. Id.  
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FPIC like the duty to not harm or right to home and property, principles 
now considered hard law, other nation states could pressure breaching 
countries to follow the FPIC.  
In Part I, this paper will illustrate the background of the FPIC and 
the rights of indigenous populations globally. Part II will address the 
pitfalls of the FPIC and give examples of states’ domestic laws failing to 
enforce the FPIC. Part III will provide how international law can move 
toward adopting the FPIC as “hard law” by analyzing the history of the 
“duty not to harm” and “right to home and property,” which are hard laws. 
Finally, Part IV will explore how the FPIC may already be embedded in 
customary hard law through cultural heritage protections.  
II. EVOLUTION OF THE FREE, PRIOR, AND  
INFORMED CONSENT PRINCIPLE 
Although the United Nations did not introduce the FPIC to 
international actors until 2007,15 the global community began discussing 
indigenous rights in the 1970s.16 “Generic protection” of indigenous 
groups is explained in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights17 and asserts, “In those [s]tates in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language.”18 As concerns around 
indigenous rights grew, the International Labour Organisation, a 
specialized branch of the UN that focuses on workers’ rights, became 
involved.19  
In 1957, the first legal document, the International Labour 
Organisation’s Convention No. 107 (“ILO 107”), was specifically created 
around indigenous rights.20 ILO 107 focused on governmental 
responsibility in integrating indigenous populations into the majority 
populations.21 Indigenous communities criticized ILO 107 as 
 
15. UNDRIP, supra note 3.  
16. ANAYA, supra note 1, at 50.  
17. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 12. 
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General 
Assembly, Mar. 23, 1976, Art. 49 I.L.M 2200A (XXI).  
19. BEN SAUL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27 (2016); 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, State of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples (UN, 2009), 2.  
20. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 13. 
21. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 13; Convention on International Labour 
Organisation, Jun. 26, 1957, 107 ILO.  
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“paternalistic” and “promoting assimilation.”22 As views and politics 
shifted, influenced by the Human Rights Conventions of 1966 and 
indigenous voices, the ILO began re-evaluating its integration policy 
under ILO 107.23 The International Labour Organisation reconvened in 
1989 and passed ILO 169.24 ILO 169 implemented tribal consultation, 
implied semi-autonomous societies, and allowed self-identification of 
status or relation to an indigenous population.25 Despite colonization 
having a deep and lasting impact on many countries, only 11 percent 
signed ILO 169, a decrease from ILO 107, which had less stringent 
restrictions.26 Of the countries that signed, the majority were from Latin 
America, with four in Europe, one in Africa, one in Asia, and one from the 
Pacific.27 
Recognizing the need to protect indigenous rights, the United 
Nations struggled to adopt its own declaration that paralleled the 
achievements of ILO 169.28 In 1982, the United Nations formed the 
Working Group on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“WGIP”) to prepare 
a draft declaration.29 In 1985, the WGIP created a declaration that included 
indigenous voices as well as research to “deepen the understanding of the 
issues involved.”30 The WGIP completed a draft declaration in August 
1993 and gave it to the Commission on Human Rights seeking support.31 
While a working group within the Commission on Human Rights planned 
on meeting every year for over ten years, the declaration failed to gain 
support from countries.32 The Commission on Human Rights failed to 
adopt the declaration from 1994 to 2006, but in June of 2006, the Human 
Rights Council (“HRC”) adopted the declaration and sought support from 
 
22. SAUL, supra note 19, at 28. 
23. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 13–14. 
24. Id. at 13.  
25. SAUL, supra note 19, at 28–29.  
26. Id. at 30. 
27. Id.  
28. Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in The Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT. L. 141, 
143 (2011). 
29. Id.  
30. ASBJØRN EIDE, The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, in ASBJØRN EIDE ET AL., MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE 
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 32, 37 (Claire 
Chartres & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009) [hereinafter Making the Declaration Work].  
31. Id. at 38. The Commission on Human Rights sets standards to govern 
human rights issues.  
32. Id. 
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the UN General Assembly.33 Despite ample support in the HRC, five 
major member countries of the UN General Assembly opposed the 
declaration’s adoption: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United States, 
and Russia.34  
One of the main criticisms was Article 19, which stated 
indigenous groups must consent to projects.35 These five opponents 
influenced a majority of African countries to vote against the declaration, 
which failed in the UN General Assembly in November 2006.36 Yet, after 
further negotiations led to nine small changes in the HRC’s draft, the 
African countries that had previously opposed the draft shifted to 
supporting the declaration.37 In September 2007, the UN General 
Assembly passed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 
creating the FPIC.38 
Executing the FPIC has been “slow and uneven by countries, 
private sector corporations, non-governmental organizations, international 
financial institutions, and the United Nations agencies.”39 With difficulties 
facing the FPIC’s effectiveness, the UN Food and Agriculture (“FAO”) 
branch created a six-step process to implement the FPIC for companies 
looking to develop in known indigenous areas.40  
(1) Identify the indigenous groups and their 
representatives.41 Information on indigenous peoples 
may be accessed through resources such as non-profit 
 
33. Id. at 38 (showing that the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia were not signatories during this vote. Later, all four countries voiced support 
for UNDRIP, including the United States in 2010.); see also 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, at 
1, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 
2007). 
34. Making the Declaration Work, supra note 30, at 39.  
35. Id. at 40.  
36. Id. at 38–39. 
37. Id. at 42 (stating most of these changes were “small and 
inconsequential[;]” however, in one larger change, the drafters changed the right to 
self-determination to include “respect for political unity of the state.” The implication 
of this is still not known, but this change was one of the reasons for the reluctant 
African countries to sign on.). 
38. Id. at 41–42.  
39. Free Prior and Informed Consent: An Indigenous peoples’ right and 
a good practice for local communities, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS, 19−30 (2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6190e.pdf [hereinafter 
FAO]. 
40. Id. at 19. 
41. Id. at 20. 
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organizations, official national censuses and 
community-based organizations.42 Step one also 
encourages entities to identify any mobile 
communities, research any local laws pertaining to the 
FPIC, and approach any indigenous community 
through their self-governance structure.43  
(2) Identify the geography and demographic information 
of the proposed development area.44 Identification 
happens through “participatory mapping,” which 
means involving indigenous community members to 
better “understand connections between people, 
places and organizations over space and/or time.”45 
This step encourages participation through all 
affected communities as well as placing 
responsibility on the project owners to determine who 
owns the proposed land and if there is non-negotiable 
land.46  
(3) Design a communication plan to disseminate project 
information in a transparent way.47 Project 
developers are encouraged to perform this step 
through meeting with indigenous peoples when and 
where they want to, conveying their right to say no, 
and documenting proceedings by providing copies to 
all parties.48  
(4) Gain consent.49 All parties must reach an agreement, 
have documents involved in the process readily 
available in the appropriate languages, identify any 
possible risks, indicate which parts of the agreement 
 
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 20–21.  
44. Id. at 21. 
45. Id. 19−30 (quoting National Co-ordinating Centre for Public 
Engagement, How to Perform Participatory Mapping (2017), 
https://www.publicengagement.ac.uk/sites/default/files/ 
publication/how_to_perform_participatory_mapping.pdf).  
46. Id. at 22–23 (explaining non-negotiable land includes sacred sites, 
burial areas, etc.). 
47. Id. at 23.  
48. Id. at 23–24.  
49. Id. at 25.  
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the indigenous peoples have not consented to, and 
establish conditions on what may lead to their 
consent.50 An agreement should include parties, 
summary of project, substantive evidence of consent, 
feedback and complaints mechanism, monitoring 
plan, and terms for withdrawal of consent.51  
(5) Monitor and evaluate aspects of the agreement.52 This 
step works to ensure participation from the impacted 
community and gives indigenous groups the ability to 
raise concerns.53  
(6) Document the lessons learned to help with future 
development goals.54  
These six steps outline one method to FAO’s approach on the 
FPIC, however, the FAO’s approach still has shortcomings.55 The FPIC’s 
duties involve duty to consult, participation, and consent have continued 
to be a significant problem due to diminished support, through lack of 
implementation and resources, from local or national governments.56 
Additionally, the FAO guidelines do not address appropriate action if an 
indigenous community does not consent to a project. In contrast, the 
International Council on Mining and Metals (“ICMM”) has a policy that 
“requires members to seek consent, but does not require members to gain 
consent,” similar to the United States’ and Canada’s rules, before 
initiating a project.57 Finally, companies may also fail to gain consent, 
and governments can step in and approve development regardless.58 In 
order to effectuate the FPIC, the participating nations need to address 
these failures.  
 
50. Id.  
51. Id. at 26. 
52. Id. at 29.  
53. Id.  
54. Id. at 30. 
55. Id. at 19−30.  
56. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 94. 
57. ANGELA ANTAKLY ET AL., INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN SOUTH AMERICA 
15−16 (Juan Sonoda ed., 2016).  
58. Id. at 16.  
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III. THE FPIC AND ITS FAILURE TO HELP INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS 
Despite the FPIC going into effect over ten years ago, companies 
and nations still commit atrocities against indigenous populations.59 In 
2018, there were 164 documented killings of individuals trying to protect 
their land.60 Latin America has the highest rate of violence against 
activists, with little government protection, as well as suffering from 
international companies extracting resources on indigenous land.61 This 
data leads to some key concerns about the FPIC among the international 
community, including implementation and lack of enforcement.  
A. Lack of Clarity in Implementation 
Fundamental issues remain with implementing the FPIC including 
isolation, internal participation, and overlap.62 Isolation is detrimental to 
the FPIC’s goals because some indigenous populations desire to live 
secluded.63 Because of their isolation, public participation and 
consultation are difficult.64 Scholars argue the “desire to be left alone” 
shows they do not give consent to projects because of their intention to 
secure their land from the outside communities.65  
This reluctance and mistrust lend itself to difficulties when 
implementing the FPIC. Another issue with the FPIC implementation is 
internal participation.66 Some indigenous groups contain marginalized 
populations like women and children, but do not allow all community 
members to participate—a concept the FPIC requires.67 For example, in 
some indigenous groups, women and children are not consulted on issues 
that affect the internal community.68 Because overall participation by 
 
59. Enemies of the State? How governments and businesses silence land 
and environmental defenders, GLOBAL WITNESS 8 (July 2019), https://www. 
globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/enemies-state/ [hereinafter 
Global Witness].  
60. Id.  
61. Id. at 9.  
62. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 173−83. 
63. Id. at 174. 
64. Id. at 175. 
65. Id. at 174. 
66. Id. at 177. 
67. Id. at 179.  
68. Id. at 177−78 (explaining the Western world’s ideas behind effective 
participation must be handled delicately with indigenous populations that have a 
different framework of society).  
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affected indigenous groups is a key part of the FPIC implementation, 
participation from “illiberal” communities is challenging.69  
A third major issue with implementation is overlap between other 
indigenous communities or entities.70 A “dichotomized” view of 
indigenous groups leads to “arbitrarily fixating indigenous peoples’ 
consensus, while disregarding the multiple and fragmented nature of the 
member subject positions.”71 By recognizing the cultural overlaps and 
differing interests among groups, developers face challenges to achieve 
one common plan and gain all groups’ consent.72  
Another key issue involves private actors like the World Bank and 
extractive resource industries’ interpretation of the FPIC.73 Because 
UNDRIP applies to governments and not private companies,74 the World 
Bank has implemented less stringent guidelines called Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consultation, except for in special circumstances where it 
advises use of the FPIC.75 As noted, the ICMM has an even lesser standard, 
which directs that development programs should engage and consult with 
indigenous peoples in a “fair, timely and culturally appropriate way 
throughout the project cycle.”76 This standard could “lead to breaches of 
international human rights standards, as companies might only do the 
minimum necessary to meet the requirements of local legislation, 
potentially failing to recognize the right to the FPIC, and thus infringing 
[on] the Indigenous right to self-determination.”77 While the ICMM is 
 
69. Id. at 177−79 (defining illiberal as “communities that internally do 
not adhere to internationally established human rights norms in relation to 
participation of marginalized groups living in these communities”). 
70. Id. at 179–83.  
71. Id. at 181 (citing Right Based Approach to Development: Exploring 
the Potential and Pitfalls, 71 (Sam Hickey & Diana Mitlin eds., 2009)). 
72. Id. at 182–83. 
73. Philippe Hanna & Frank Vanclay, Human rights, Indigenous peoples 
and the concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Impact Assessment and Project 
Appraisal, 31 HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 146, 151 (2013). 
74. ANTAKLY, supra note 57, at 11.  
75. HANNA, supra note 73, at 151 (stating special circumstances include 
“Impacts on Lands and Natural Resources Subject to Traditional Ownership or Under 
Customary Use,” “Relocation of Indigenous Peoples from Lands and Natural 
Resources Subject to Traditional Ownership or Under Customary Use” and for 
projects that impact “Critical Cultural Heritage”).  
76. Id.  
77. Id. (citing Bethany Haalboom, The Intersection of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Guidelines and Indigenous Rights: Examining Neoliberal Governance 
of a Proposed Mining Project in Suriname 43, GEOFORUM 2012, at 969–79, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.06.003); see also Environmental 
Assessment: Dakota Access Pipeline Project 2 (2016) (stating the Standing Rock 
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taking steps to follow the FPIC, ultimately, it can still decide to move 
forward with projects, even if there is opposition or a lack of consensus.78 
Finally, it remains unclear if the “consent” part of the FPIC 
includes veto power.79 Without veto power, the FPIC loses strength 
because projects can continue to move forward. As of now, the 
international community recognizes tribal consultation as the customary 
norm.80 For instance, the United States has a “long-standing executive 
branch policy to incorporate special [tribal] status into regulatory 
processes,” but it does not include tribal veto power on projects.81 
Similarly, Canada has a duty to consult with indigenous communities 
during the Environmental Impact Assessment phase which includes 
“good-faith consultation” and willingness to make changes based on 
information obtained during assessments.82 Canada’s policy, however, 
does not include tribal consultation as determinative of whether the project 
moves forward, even if indigenous communities are opposed.83 
Unfortunately, as shown in Canada’s and the United States’ policies, the 
question of whether nation states need to obtain consent from indigenous 
communities is usually answered in the negative because governments can 
weigh economic benefit to regulate resources for all citizens, not just its 
indigenous groups.84 
B. Lack of Enforcement 
Along with implementation issues, the FPIC faces a lack of 
enforcement in countries that have adopted it, which non-compliant 
countries would have to resolve if the FPIC was considered hard law. 
Some of the biggest breaches of the FPIC stem primarily from Latin 
American countries,85 even though Latin American countries comprise the 
 
Sioux Tribe opposed a pipeline development from crossing a waterbody upstream 
from their water takes, and the Tribe argued they were not adequately consulted on 
the project despite the project moving forward).  
78. ANTAKLY, supra note 57, at 16.  
79. CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 52.  
80. YANG, supra note 2, at 571. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. at 573. 
83. Id.  
84. CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 53; see also Mauro Barelli, Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1, 
5 (2012).  
85. Global Witness, supra note 59, at 9. 
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majority of countries that signed ILO 169.86 This issue is referred to as the 
“governance gap,” which means a nation state fails to protect populations 
because of lack of mechanisms to ensure compliance.87 Additionally, there 
is no legal entity or instrument to enforce compliance because UNDRIP is 
nonbinding unless it is carried out in domestic law.88  
Further, a government’s right to develop and the FPIC often 
conflict, particularly in developing countries.89 State versus tribal 
sovereignty and ownership of national resources are often still debated.90 
Because nation states argue these resources “are the benefit for all,” courts 
often side with nations on ownership issues.91  
Issues over rights to develop and resource ownership are further 
conflated due to large inconsistencies between an international, national, 
and domestic regulation, known as the “implementation gap.”92 The 
Philippines exemplifies the implementation gap in a conflict with Dole 
Asia, one of the largest producers of bananas, which is backed by 
companies like JP Morgan Chase.93 The Philippines is a signatory to 
UNDRIP,94 and it also holds its own national policies surrounding 
indigenous rights such as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act.95 Despite 
the international and national policies, the Philippines has inconsistently 
implemented indigenous protection policies. For example, in the Bukidon 
region, the indigenous KADIMADC community stated a wealthy 
landowner, who owns the largest gun-making factory in the country, was 
illegally sub-leasing indigenous land for a Dole plantation without their 
 
86. SAUL, supra note 19, at 30.  
87. HANNA, supra note 73, at 149.  
88. Id. 
89. CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 54−55.  
90. Id. at 52−53. 
91. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 647, https://www.icj 
-cij.org/public/files/case-related/91/091-19960711-JUD-01-05EN.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2021); CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 53−54. 
92. CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 53.  
93. Global Witness, supra note 59, at 20.  
94. UNDRIP, supra note 3.  
95. Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (2017); see also Lynette Torres, 
Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines: Perspective on Inclusion, Global Observatory 
for Inclusion (June 15, 2016), http://www.globi-observatory.org/indigenous-peoples-in 
-the-philippines-perspectives-on-inclusion/ (stating the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act 
“affirms Indigenous Peoples’ rights to ancestral domains, self-governance and 
empowerment, social justice and human rights, and rights to cultural identity); see 
generally UNDRIP, supra note 3.  
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consent.96 Dole failed to take steps in reviewing this land lease to 
determine if the land was disputed and if the FPIC was granted.97 Because 
of Dole’s lack of due diligence, the community’s indigenous peoples 
turned to local government to investigate allegations.98 Reportedly, instead 
of investigating, government officials tried to bribe indigenous members 
to sign consent forms.99 The KADIMADC people remained on their land, 
but the wealthy landowner’s security personnel in the area have threatened 
the community with loss of homes and life.100 The Philippines government 
is failing to implement the FPIC on a national and local level, and it has 
failed to implement the UNDRIP policies it agreed to at an international 
level.  
The Ixquisis peoples’ struggles in Guatemala show another 
example of indigenous groups fighting to overcome their country’s 
conflicting regulations and right to develop.101 After the end of the 
Guatemalan Civil War in 1996, the country opened itself to foreign 
development to boost its economy.102 As a result, many projects began 
developing, including the San Andrés and Pojom II dams.103 A large 
funder of these dam projects is the Inter-American Development Bank, 
which has received international criticism for investing in the project.104 
The Ixquisis community alleges the dam projects have contaminated their 
rivers, affecting their ability to fish, farm, and maintain cultural 
traditions.105 An activist group, including indigenous leaders, criticized the 
dam project due to the company’s failure to consult the indigenous 
community.106 Despite Guatemala adopting UNDRIP, the government 
allowed development without indigenous consultation.107 Due to lack of 
consultation, multiple members of the indigenous activist movement, “the 
Peaceful Resistance of the Ixquisis,” protested the hydroelectric dam 
project on their land.108  
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This hydroelectric dam project—owned and operated by one of 
the wealthiest families in Guatemala—has caused “a wave of forced and 
violent evictions” of the Ixquisis people.109 Recently, Guatemalan police 
have targeted the Peaceful Resistance of the Ixquisis because of their work 
defending land rights.110 Sadly, the protests have led to even more Ixquisis 
being injured and murdered.111 Because the political and economic clout 
of the family who owns the dam project, the protesters are unable to seek 
police help or support from their government.112 The government has 
cancelled talks with indigenous leaders, which would have been led by 
Guatemala’s human rights ombudsman.113 Case studies such as this, where 
a country fails to enforce the FPIC at national and international levels, 
appear all over the world.114 In order to improve implementation and 
compliance, the international community must see the FPIC as binding law.  
IV. THE FPIC AND THE PUSH TOWARD HARD LAW 
International law evolves from a variety of places, such as treaties, 
customary law, judicial decisions, or universal norms.115 First, this section 
will address how laws become customary (“hard law”), while highlighting 
that the FPIC is still only soft law. Second, this section will analyze how 
a customary law is developed by tracing the steps of the hard law 
principles “duty not to harm” and “right to home and property.” Third, it 
will address what steps the UN and nation states can take to develop the 
FPIC into new hard law. Finally, this paper will explore the FPIC’s 
incorporation into already existing hard law, the international obligation 
to preserve cultural resources.  
A. Hard Law v. Soft Law 
Customary law is defined as “the set of rules of state practice that 
are consistently and uniformly followed by states based on a sense of legal 
obligation.”116 Customary international law has three elements: (1) “state 
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practice must be widespread and virtually uniform in conformance with 
the rule;” (2) belief that the practice is “legally compelled” (opinio juris); 
and (3) the act is taken by a significant number of states and not rejected 
by a significant number of states.117 On the other hand, soft law is often 
considered “not yet law.”118 Soft law may not be seen by nations as law 
because it is not legally binding, it is not intended to be law, or it is 
unenforceable law.119 Soft law may become customary international law 
through a process called crystallization.120 Crystallization occurs through 
judicial precedent frequently citing the principle, treaties, or voluntary 
commitments, or a majority of nations making their actions toward a new 
norm.121 
The first element in forming customary international law is 
nations’ widespread conformity to the practice.122 For example, ILO 169 
is an international binding document on indigenous rights; however, only 
20 countries have signed on.123 Clearly, only 20 signatories indicates a lack 
of conformity to the principle. While a majority of countries have signed 
onto UNDRIP,124 the state practice of implementing the principle is not 
uniform. For instance, interpreting whether indigenous groups have veto 
power creates significant ambiguity in the international community, and it 
leads to inconsistencies with implementation.125 Even courts’ judicial 
frameworks have been inconsistent, which creates issues with nations 
uniformly executing the FPIC.126  
The second element is a belief that the practice is legally 
compelled.127 UNDRIP is a non-binding but “morally obligatory” 
declaration of indigenous rights.128 In fact, experts argue the reason so 
many nations signed on to UNDRIP was due to the nonbinding legal 
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status, whereas only 20 nations signed onto ILO 169 because it is legally 
binding.129 Both Canada and the United States, initially refusing to sign 
UNDRIP, finally signed between 2009 and 2010—stating the declaration 
does not reflect customary international law and does not change their 
national laws.130 New Zealand expressed similar notions when it signed in 
2010, stating UNDRIP “expresses new, and non-binding, aspirations.”131  
Additionally, there is not enough legal compulsion through judicial 
precedent to cause the FPIC to bind participating nations. Because the 
FPIC is a relatively new concept, there are only a handful of relevant cases.  
Saramaka People v. Suriname132 is important because it is the first 
case that explored the FPIC and it revealed a number of issues that need 
to be resolved in order for countries to effectively implement the FPIC.133 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an autonomous tribunal 
overseeing human rights’ violations in Central and South American 
countries, ruled that indigenous tribes must be able to give consent to 
safeguard their lands.134 The court referenced sections from UNDRIP, 
particularly Article 32, stating “the State has a duty, not only to consult 
with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed 
consent, according to their customs and traditions.”135 The court, however, 
declined to elaborate on whether consultation with the goals of the FPIC 
in mind were enough, or if the FPIC created a stronger duty to obtain 
consent.136 Unfortunately, even four years after the judgment, Suriname 
still had not met the court’s order to demarcate the Saramaka’s land.137  
In another landmark case, Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayuku 
v. Equador,138 the court upheld the need for participation rights, 
established in Suriname, and further elaborated that there is a duty to 
consult based on the FPIC as well as a duty of consent for large scale 
projects.139 In 2008, the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights issued a court decision that cited principles from the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights stating “[f]ailure to . . . consult or to 
seek consent . . . results in a violation.”140 Despite the recognition toward 
 
129. HANNA, supra note 73, at 151.  
130. Engle, supra note 28, at 145 n.9. 
131. Id.  
132. IACtHR. (ser. C) No.172 (2007).  
133. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 220.  
134. Id. at 263. 
135. Id. at 265 (internal citations omitted). 
136. Id. at 265. 
137. Id. at 274. 
138. IACtHR (ser. C) No. 245 (2012). 
139. Id. at 287. 
140. Id. at 305. 
2020   FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT 257 
other judicial precedent, the UN Special Rapporteur still “contended that 
the form of [FPIC] implementation is context dependent and that there is 
no ‘single formula.’”141 Many courts, such as the European Court of 
Human Rights, which oversees numerous indigenous populations, still 
have no jurisprudence on the FPIC.142 This indicates a significant number 
of courts are not citing to the FPIC judicial precedent, which makes the 
FPIC legally ineffective in most nations.  
Finally, the third element of customary law requires that a 
significant number of nations execute and not reject the FPIC, and that the 
FPIC is not rejected by a significant number of nations.143 Here, a majority 
of nations have adopted this principle with 144 original signatories in 
2007—the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand later voicing 
support.144 At least on paper, a significant portion of states support the FPIC. 
However, signatory countries like the Philippines and Guatemala are still 
failing to execute the principle successfully.145 While the FPIC may satisfy 
the third element, there is no indication of widespread conformance or 
belief that the FPIC is legally binding. Because the FPIC is still soft law, 
it is important to compare with hard law principles like the duty to not 
harm and right to home and property in order to analyze how it can become 
customary law.  
B. Hard Law Principles: Duty Not to Harm  
and Right to Home and Property 
The international community now see duty not to harm and right 
to home and property as widespread, legally compelled, and adopted by 
almost all nations. This indicates that nations view these two concepts as 
hard law and binding. 
Duty not to harm “recognize[s] state responsibility for 
transboundary air pollution,” and created a duty on the polluting nation to 
pay for any damages caused by their transboundary harm.146 In 1941, 
during arbitration between the United States and Canada, a tribunal 
decided Trail Smelter, a major case, which established the now customary 
international law: the duty not to harm.147  
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In Trail Smelter, a private Canadian company’s smelter site 
emitted sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere causing damage to United 
States farms and citizens.148 The two countries brought the dispute to the 
International Joint Commission, which awarded the United States 
$350,000 in damages.149 The United States, unsatisfied, proposed 
arbitration and Canada agreed.150 The Tribunal used the “‘general 
principles of international law on State liability for cross-border 
damages’” to establish the now recognized duty not to harm.151 Because 
of this decision, the Trail Smelter case has become a norm in international 
law with a case in the International Court of Justice, the Pulp Mills case, 
continuing to recognize the transboundary harm rule put forth in Trail 
Smelter.152  
Additionally, the duty not to harm is memorialized in treaties and 
other international instruments. For example, the Stockholm Declaration 
expressed the duty not to harm in its Principle 21, which states that 
“sovereign states may not allow their territory to be used to cause harm to 
the environment of other states or the global commons.”153 The duty not 
to harm developed quickly, but customary international law has been 
judged as a “more or less subjective weighing of the evidence.”154 Nations 
follow the duty not to harm rule because of its presence in international 
judicial precedent, memorialization in treaties, and its general acceptance 
among nation states.  
Another example of a hard law principle is the right to home and 
property. The United Nations initiated the right to home and property 
principle under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The 
UDHR—created to prevent future atrocities seen during World War II—
states “[e]veryone has the right to own property.”155 While the UDHR is 
not a binding document, “it is considered a codification of the underlying 
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substantive customary international law norms.”156 Agreements like the 
American Convention on Human Rights further codify the right to 
property and home through Article 21, which lays out a fundamental right 
to property.157  
Judicial proceedings also solidify the right to home and property 
concept, such as in the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECHR”) 
Lopez Ostra v. Spain holding.158 This case set precedent when the ECHR 
held severe environmental pollution constitutes a violation of right to 
home and property, and therefore, a state violates the right to home if it 
does not strike a fair balance between the severe pollution that caused the 
harm and the economic interests.159 The international community 
recognizes and extends the right to home and property through a number 
of treaties and cases like Lopez Ostra. The international unity and support 
behind this human rights’ principle indicates that the FPIC, focusing on 
indigenous human rights, will be more successful once it is codified.  
C. Making the FPIC Emerging Customary International Law 
Ultimately, customary law “is an evolutionary process where 
there is likely to be disagreement about its status . . . during the process of 
its creation.”160 The mere fact that scholars still debate whether the FPIC 
is customary international law shows that it is not yet hard law. The FPIC 
is slowly becoming crystallized into hard law, yet, there is still ambiguity 
about executing the principle among countries that have signed UNDRIP. 
The FPIC may become customary international law by solidifying the first 
two of the three customary law elements: (1) widespread conformity and 
(2) belief the principle is legally binding.161 
To establish widespread uniform practices, nations must address 
issues with implementation. If states are not uniformly executing the FPIC, 
then the first element of creating international customary law cannot be 
satisfied.162 For instance, the governance gap, as previously mentioned, 
could be resolved through looking at writings and suggestions from 
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scholarly articles. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization has 
produced guidelines on how to implement the FPIC.163 Also, the UN 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner published a guide on 
implementing frameworks involving human rights.164 The guidelines 
suggest states should promote respect for human rights among their 
commercial transactions.165 Additionally, the right to home and property 
rule could be used as a building block to extend into indigenous rights.  
Another important guideline to conformity is ensuring 
governmental departments and agencies are providing support and 
information to local branches of government.166 Adopting these principles 
could allow countries to apply pressure on ICMM to change its guidelines, 
and if not, force companies in their own countries to comply with more 
stringent consent standards. By continuing to publish frameworks for the 
FPIC, nations and leading scholars can begin to use these frameworks to 
eventually satisfy the widespread conformity element in customary law.  
The second element, belief the practice is legally binding,167 can 
be satisfied through consistent legally-binding judicial decisions. By 
issuing judicial decisions like the holding in Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, the court “appeared to interpret elements of the UN Declaration 
as having gained the status of international custom.”168 Additionally, the 
court created a legal framework of five elements to implement valid 
consultation: (1) consultation must be sufficient and prior to the 
development plan; (2) the consultation goal must be to reach an agreement 
in good faith; (3) consultation must be adequate and accessible in line with 
the indigenous peoples’ decision-making models; (4) an environmental 
impact assessment must be conducted adequately with participation of the 
community; and (5) the consultation process must meet informational 
requirements, which include constant communication.169 As the 
international community has begun to see, court systems outside the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights have used this key framework. One 
example is the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.170 
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Ideally this will lead to consistent and set rules that nations, along with 
international court systems, will look to as legally binding.  
Educating signatory nation states on some of these suggestions 
may help with developing national constitutions, and the UN can begin 
promoting consistent key frameworks that legally bind nations. 
Ultimately, the frameworks for the FPIC implementation will come 
through other courts adopting the holdings from previous cases, as shown 
in Trail Smelter. Potentially, the best way to speed the process of adopting 
frameworks would be through a decision by the International Justice 
Court—which is legally binding on all UN signatories171—that enshrines 
the concepts the Inter-American Court on Human Rights laid out in 
Saramaka. Another way to speed the process would be to recognize the 
FPIC as an already established concept.  
D. The FPIC Inclusion in Existing International Laws  
Surrounding Cultural Resource Protection 
United Nation’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”), a specialized United Nation’s Agency, had five 
conventions focusing on preserving cultural heritage.172 These five 
conventions included: (1) the 1954 Hague Convention and its two 
protocols; (2) the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illegal Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership with 
Cultural Property; (3) the World Heritage Convention; (4) Underwater 
Cultural Heritage Convention; and (5) Intangible Cultural Heritage 
Convention.173 The FPIC has the potential of becoming hard law through 
incorporation into these already existing conventions protecting cultural 
resources. In particular, two main conventions that form the customary 
principle surrounding cultural resource protections could apply: (1) The 
Hague Convention and (2) the World Heritage Convention. 
 In response to the “cultural atrocities perpetuated by Nazi 
Germany during World War II,” a number of European countries proposed 
protections through the Hague Convention, the first and oldest 
international treaty protecting cultural resources.174 The 1954 Hague 
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Convention laid out measures to prevent destruction of cultural heritage 
sites specifically during armed conflicts; however, the United States did 
not ratify the Hague Convention until 2008.175 The Hague Convention 
allows criminal prosecution for those who threaten cultural sites, including 
“theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against 
cultural property protected under the Convention.”176  
World leaders recently recognized the significance of the Hague 
Convention when former President Donald Trump threatened to bomb 
Iranian cultural sites and was met with intense backlash from the 
international community.177 United States Senator Tim Kaine stated, “The 
pledge to attack cultural sites, likely, is a violation of international law,” 
while the Metropolitan Museum of Art emphasized there is global 
importance in protecting cultural resources that connect people with their 
communities.178 The Hague Convention is legally binding on the 121 
countries that have ratified it.179 
Similarly, nations came together to protect natural heritage sites 
through the World Heritage Convention.180 While the Hague Convention 
covers cultural heritage in times of war, the World Heritage Convention 
sought to address impacts such as industrialism, economic upheaval, and 
climate change on heritage sites.181 The World Heritage Convention was 
as much about protecting culture as it was about protecting the 
environment.182 The World Heritage Convention has contributed to the 
development of international customs, particularly in relation to ergo 
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omnes, a concept that is considered an international law norm.183 Ergo 
Omnes means “toward everyone.”184 The World Heritage Convention 
captures the ergo omnes concept in its preamble, which recognizes the 
duty of the international community to preserve heritage sites for the 
benefit of all people.185  
The Convention is also binding on its 186 signatories,186 but it 
contains no legal consequences for destruction of listed sites.187 Instead, 
signatories can benefit from grant funding, heritage site listings, and 
assisting signatories with sites that are considered high risk for 
degradation.188 Although the World Heritage Convention does not have 
any specific language on settling disputes for breaching parties, a breach 
of a customary concept, such as ergo omnes, could amount to an 
“internationally wrongful act,” which could pressure nations toward 
international enforcement.189 
Because protecting cultural resources is tantamount to the 
FPIC’s goals, the FPIC could easily be incorporated into established 
cultural heritage protections that international law already recognizes as 
binding. The World Heritage Convention’s Preamble aligns with the 
FPIC’s vision. It states that “existing international conventions, 
recommendations and resolutions concerning cultural and natural 
property demonstrate the importance, for all the peoples of the world, of 
safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people 
it may belong.”190 Indigenous communities seek to protect lands that are 
considered unique and irreplaceable property. For instance, indigenous 
lands are used for religious and traditional practices such as prayer, 
rituals, festivals, and other cultural ceremonies.191 Extending cultural 
heritage to include indigenous lands is a natural progression.  
Once the international community uniformly recognizes the FPIC 
as part of this customary law, the UN and other non-breaching countries 
can begin demanding that other countries follow the FPIC through 
cessation, assurances, guarantees, and reparations.192 There may even be 
 
183. Id. at 277.  
184. YANG, supra note 2, at 58.  
185. FOREST, supra note 172, at 277.  
186. Id. at 228.  
187. Id. at 278.  
188. Id. at 267, 278.  
189. Id. at 400–01. (For example, international enforcement could include 
cessation or sanctions.). 
190. World Heritage Convention, supra note 180, at Preamble.  
191. SAUL, supra note 19, at 166.  
192. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
GAOR, 56th Session No. 10 U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Arts. 30–31(2001). 
264 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 44 
potential for criminal charges against companies who “theft, pillage or 
misappropriate” cultural resources or those that cause “extensive 
destruction or appropriation of cultural property” protected under the 
Hague Convention.193 
V. CONCLUSION 
While UNDRIP and the FPIC’s adoption is a big step in 
internationally recognizing indigenous rights, it is still far from effective. 
The FPIC’s historical development may help to strengthen the intentions 
behind UNDRIP. The FPIC’s intentions will be further solidified if the 
international community recognizes it as hard law, whether through a 
newly recognized concept or one that is already established in customary 
law. By recognizing the FPIC as binding hard law on the international 
world, the issues such as lack of clarity in implementation and lack of 
enforcement would be resolved because clearer frameworks would be 
developed. The FPIC can only be effective if nations consider it binding 
hard law.  
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